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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KIM, • J, TANNER, ) BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ) 
) Court of Appeals 
vs. ) No. 8 90521-CA 
Defendant and Respondent 
Appellant *.m. r< "ann^" submits ':> * foil >winy -r.-if 
pursuant tu uiy Rules ot cri \ ^ ^ a ! > 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE 
IJ CA 31A-2-307 a n d U CA 78-2-2(3)(j) confer jur i s d i c t i < D n 
Liie Supreme " : : ! • • = * t i n i l iH'lqment. 
'. :e case was poarod-ovo: :. vie '.'oun. :^ Appeals jnder Lie 
authority ~ ~n- Htih Supreme Court. 
This appea ! is from a • * i< 
. v • had been requester, to c^olar^ tne -nea.inc of 
1
 ;orl. i "^'i ' tie I n s u r a n c e C o d e p u r s u a n t t ~> ts a u t n o r i t ^ ide-
1 r \ \^.\-"* — ' — ovi ~i ~>n n q u e s t 
uur-j i.iaf. t ^ r the '" <:-: ^  . ! Household 
< er V;^es >\ lowdnco"; wiich reads as follows: 
Personal injury protection coverages and 
benefits include: 
. • . a special damage allowance not 
exceeding $20 per day for a maximum of 365 days, 
for services actually rendered or expenses 
reasonably incurred for services that, but for the 
injury, the injured person would have performed 
for his household, except that this benefit need 
not be paid for the first three days after the 
date of injury unless the person's inability to 
perform these services continues for more than two 
consecutive weeks;• . . 
Motions for summary judgment were heard by the 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup who granted The Phoenix Insurance 
Company summary judgment in its favor and denied the motion of 
Kim Tanner. The judgment was entered on May 30, 1989. No 
motions were filed pursuant to Rules 50, 52 or 59. Notice of 
Appeal was filed on June 26, 1989 and amended on June 29, 1989. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does the No-Fault Household Services Allowance 
provide for a special damage allowance not exceeding $20 per day 
of disability or is it limited to $20 per day of services? The 
first interpretation places an aggregate limit on benefits based 
on days of disability while the second places a limit on each day 
services are received. There is no dispute over whether the 
allowance is limited to services actually rendered or expenses 
reasonably incurred for services that, but for the injury, the 
injured person would have performed for his household. 
2. The following two issues were raised in the Third 
and Fourth Defenses of The Phoenix Insurance Company's Answer 
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(Record pp. 8-9). However, in its memorandum supporting its 
motion for summary judgment, Phoenix appears to deny these are 
issues (Record pp. 42-43). Kim Tanner includes them here since 
clarification of the statute is the objective and both were part 
of her motion for summary judgment. 
a. Does the No-Fault Household Services Allowance 
provide benefits for services rendered by family members that, 
but for the injury, the injured person would have performed for 
his household? 
b. Does the No-Fault Household Services Allowance 
provide benefits for the labor portion of the expense for meals 
eaten at a restaurant if, but for the injury, the injured person 
would have provided the labor portion of similar meals for his 
household? 
STATUTORY REFERENCES 
The following statutes are believed to be pertinent to, 
if not determinative of, the interpretation issues: 
1. Historical antecedents of UCA 31A-22-307(1)(b)(ii): 
The No-Fault Household Services Allowance concept first 
entered Utah law as part of the Utah Automobile No-Fault 
Insurance Act, Laws 1973, Chapter 55 and was codified as the 
former UCA 31-41-6(1)(b)(ii) which provided as follows: 
In lieu of reimbursement for expenses which 
would have been reasonably incurred for 
services that, but for the injury, the injured 
person would have performed for his household 
and regardless of whether any of these 
-3-
expenses are actually incurred, an allowance 
of $12 per day commencing not later than three 
(3) days after the date of the injury and 
continuing for a maximum of 365 days 
thereafter, but if the person's inability to 
perform these services shall so continue for 
in excess of a total of fourteen (14) days 
after the date of the injury, this three-day 
elimination period shall not be applicable. 
Laws 1979 Chapter 119, Section 1 amended this provision of the 
code to read as follows: 
A special damages allowance not exceeding 
$12 per day for services actually rendered or 
expenses reasonably incurred for services 
that, but Eor the injury, the injured person 
would have performed for his household 
commencing not later than three days after the 
date of the injury and continuing for a 
maximum of 365 days thereafter, but if the 
person's inability to perform these services 
shall so continue for in excess of a total of 
fourteen days after the date of the injury, 
this three-day elimination period shall not be 
applicable. 
Laws 1985 Chapter 242 repealed UCA 31-41-6(1)(b)(ii) 
and enacted UCA 31A-22-307(1)(b)(ii) which has not since been 
amended. The text of this statute appears under "Juridiction and 
Nature of the Case." 
2. Construction rules: 
a. UCA 68-3-2: 
The rule of the common law that 
statutes in derogation thereof are to 
be strictly construed has no 
application to the statutes of this 
state. The statutes establish the 
laws of this state respecting the 
subjects to which they relate, and 
their provisions and all proceedings 
under them are to be liberally 
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construed with a view to effect the 
objects of the statutes and to promote 
justice. Whenever there is any 
variance between the rules of equity 
and the rules of common law in 
reference to the same matter the rules 
of equity shall prevail. 
b. UCA 68-3-6: 
The provisons of any statute, so far 
as they are the same as those of any 
prior statute, shall be construed as a 
continuation of such provisions, and 
not as a new enactment. 
c. UCA 31A-1-102(2): 
The purposes of the Insurance Code are 
to: . . . 
(2) ensure that policyholders, 
claimants, and insurers are treated 
fairly and equitably; . . . 
d. UCA 31A-1-20K1): 
(1) This code shall be liberally 
construed to achieve the purposes 
stated in §3lA-l-102 and under other 
chapters of the Insurance Code. The 
statements of purpose shall aid and 
guide interpretation but are not 
independent sources of power. 
3. Administrative History. 
After making inquiry of the Insurance Department, 
counsel is not aware of any rule, order, or administrative law 
decision by the Commissioner of the Insurance Department under 
UCA 31A-2-201 which directly addresses the issues raised herein. 
However, Insurance Department Regulation R540-74-l(D) discussed 
an earlier version of the statute. The regulation was repealed 
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November 20, 1988 but is set out here for the Court's reference. 
D. Section 31-41-6(1)(b)(ii) . This 
subsection provides a $12 per day benefit for 
substitute services, whether or not expenses 
for such services are actually incurred, 
payable for the period of time the injured 
person is unable to perform services for his 
household. 
To determine the eligibility for payment 
and the amount to be paid, it is necessary to 
verify that: 
(1) the injured person customarily 
performed the service, and 
(2) the injured person is now unable to 
perform the service. 
The benefit commences not later than three 
days after the date of injury and continues 
for a maximum of 365 consecutive days after 
the date of injury. However, if a person's 
inability to perform these services continues 
for in excess of a total of 14 consecutive 
days after the date of injury, the three-day 
elimination period is not applicable. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is concerned solely with the interpretation 
of the No-Fault Household Service Allowance, UCA 
31A-22-307(1)(b)(ii). The statute, proceedings, and disposition 
below are set out above under "Jurisdiction and Nature of the 
Case." The facts underlying the request for interpretation were 
stated in the Brief in Support of Kim Tanner's Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Record pp. 14-15) and admitted in Defendant's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
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Judgment and in Favor of Its Motion for Summary Judgment (Record 
p. 41). The facts initially were set out in the petition (Record 
pp. 1-2) and admitted in the Answer (Record pp. 7-8). 
The agreed facts are as follows: 
a. Petitioner has a substantial interest in the result 
of the declaratory interpretation of the No-Fault Household 
Services Allowance because she was in a motor vehicle accident on 
June 16f 1988 which gave rise to a personal injury protection 
claim under this subsection. 
b. The Phoenix Insurance Company will be affected by 
this judgment because it is the insurance company which is 
initially charged with paying petitioner her personal injury 
protection benefits. 
c. Petitioner has filed claims under this subsection 
with The Phoenix Insurance Company, which has processed these 
claims according to the "Household Services Worksheet" attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference. 
d. As shown on Exhibit "A", The Phoenix Insurance 
Company has interpreted the No-Fault Household Services Allowance 
to place a daily limit on the compensable services and expenses. 
For example, the Household Services Worksheet shows $10 of 
services on 6/22/88 and $32 of services on 6/23/88. Ten dollars 
is allowed for 6/22/88 but only $20 is allowed for 6/23/88. For 
another example, no allowance is made for days in July and August 
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on which no services are shown as received although earlier 
services aggregate more than $20 per day. 
e. The Phoenix Insurance Company has allowed claims 
for household services of petitioner's husband and for a portion 
of the expense of restaurant meals. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The No-Fault Household Services Allowance is ambiguous 
in that it allows up to "$20 per day for a maximum of 365 days" 
but does not state whether it is $20 per day of disability or $20 
per day of services. 
If the statute means days of disability, then Phoenix 
is in error in its interpretation. Fifteen days of disability 
should authorize up to $300 "for services actually rendered or 
expenses reasonably incurred" without regard to whether such 
services or expenses exceeded $20 on a given day. 
UCA 68-3-6 points to prior incarnations of a statute 
and directs that current provisions be viewed as continuations of 
prior provisions so far as they are the same. The 1973 household 
allowances provision was based on days of disability, which 
interpretation should continue in the present statute. 
UCA 68-3-2, UCA 31A-1-102(2), and the remedial nature 
of the statute mandate a liberal and equitable construction. The 
only construction which is liberal and equitable is $20 per day 
of disability. 
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The reference to 365 days in "$20 per day for a maximum 
of 365 days" implies a maximum of one year and corresponds to the 
one-year limit on lost wage compensation. A one-year limit is 
logically consistent with days of disability which tend to be 
contiguous, but is inconsistent with days of services which tend 
to be non-contiguous. 
The No-Fault Household Services Allowance is not 
concerned with the source of services. Services by family 
members and restaurants are compensable. 
ARGUMENT 
The No-Fault Household Services 
Allowance Statute is Ambiguous. 
The No-Fault Household Services Allowance statute is 
ambiguous in that it allows up to "$20 per day for a maximum of 
365 days" but does not state whether it is $20 per day of 
disability or $20 per day of services. 
If the statute means days of disability, then Phoenix 
is in error in its interpretation. Fifteen days of disability 
should authorize up to $300 "for services actually rendered or 
expenses reasonably incurred" without regard to whether such 
services or expenses exceeded $20 on a given day. Thus, if an 
insured is disabled for fifteen days, she could hire a 
housekeeper to come every other day to do four hours work at $10 
per hour without exceeding the allowance. 
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Phoenix interprets the allowance to mean $20 per day of 
services. In its view, the disabled insured who hires a 
housekeeper to come every other day at $10 per hour can only 
receive two hours of work per visit without exceeding the 
allowance. 
Prior Statutes Indicate Days 
of Disability Were Intended, 
UCA 68-3-6 (set out in "Statutory References") directs 
that the present No-Fault Household Services Allowance, so far as 
it is the same as any prior statute, shall be construed as a 
continuation of earlier statutes and not as a new enactment. The 
first such statute known to counsel is UCA 31-41-6(1)(b)(ii), 
enacted in Laws 1973 (set out in "Statutory References"). This 
provision gave an injured insured a benefit of "$12 per day" in 
lieu of reimbursement for expenses to replace lost services and 
regardless of whether expenses were actually incurred. In Wilde 
vs. Mid-Century Insurance, 635 P.2d 417 (Utah 1981), the Court 
stated: 
The benefit provided under the No-Fault Act 
entitled plaintiffs to recover $12 per day for 
a maximum of 365 days simply by a showing that 
Carrielee was disabled so that she could not 
perform household services which "but for the 
injury, [she] would have performed for [her] 
household." Wilde, supra, at 420. 
The 1973 statute was amended by Laws 1979 (set out 
under "Statutory References") to limit the benefit to an 
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"allowance not exceeding $12 per day for services actually 
rendered or expenses reasonably incurred." The point of the 
amendment was to stop providing benefits where no services were 
rendered or expenses incurred. It did not limit benefits to $12 
per day of services. 
Laws 1985 repealed the No-Fault Household Services 
Allowance then re-enacted a similar provision which has remained 
unchanged. This current statute provides "a special damage 
allowance not exceeding $20 per day for a maximum of 365 daysf 
for services actually rendered or expenses reasonably 
incurred . . . " Once again, it did not limit benefits to $20 per 
day (Df services. 
Liberal and Equitable Interpretations 
Requires Days of Disability. 
UCA 68-3-2 (set out in "Statutory References") provides 
that the No-Fault Household Services Allowance is to be 
"liberally construe with a view to effect the objects of the 
statutes and to promote justice." UCA 31A-1-20K1) and 
31A-1-102(2) (set out in "Statutory References") mandate a 
liberal construction to "insure that policyholders, claimants, 
and insurers are treated fairly and equitably; . . . " 
A liberal and equitable construction of the No-Fault 
Household Services Allowance should avoid the unjust, absurd, and 
unreasonable consequences which flow from the "$20 per day of 
services" interpretation. Assume, for argument's sake, that 
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housecleaning services cost $10.00 an hour. If a housewife is 
injured in an automobile accident and seeks the No-Fault 
Household Services Allowance, she must arrange to have the 
cleaner come for only two hours each day (which the cleaner may 
not be willing to do) under Phoenix's interpretation. If she has 
the cleaner come for four hours every other day or for eight 
hours every four days, her benefit is halved or quartered 
although she has received exactly the same amount of service. 
Why should an insured be penalized for hiring help once a week 
instead of multiple short visits? 
Assume again that four helpful neighbors each provide a 
dinner on the same day and that each dinner represents $10 of 
services. One dinner is eaten on the first day and the other 
three are saved for the succeeding three nights. Under the "$20 
per day of services" interpretation, only $20 is payable even 
though $40 would be payable had the neighbors each prepared a 
dinner on a different night. 
No worthy policy is served by limiting benefits to $20 
per day of services. It penalizes reasonable behavior, traps the 
unwary, and creates an administrative nightmare for the injured 
party. Its sole redeeming "virtue" is minimizing the benefits 
mandated by the legislature. Even that "virtue" may be 
imaginary, as pointed out in Gulla, below. 
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The "$20 per day of disability" interpretation provides 
a far more just and reasonable result. Injured persons have a 
budget which is directly related to their days of disability. 
This budget can be applied to "services actually rendered or 
expenses reasonably incurred" in whatever manner is the most 
appropriate under the circumstances. 
The Superior Court of New Jersey considered a similar 
question in Gulla vs. Allstate Insurance Companyy 180 N.J. Super. 
413, 434 A.2d 1158 (1981). Gulla interpreted a New Jersey 
statute providing for no-fault essential services benefits. 
Determining that the statute was remedial and was to be given 
liberal construction, the court interpreted the statute to permit 
recovery of either $12.00 per day for each day of disability, 
whether or not payment for services was made on a daily basis, or 
$4,380, whichever is less: 
N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 provides: 
Payment of essential services benefits to an 
injured person shall be made in reimbursement 
of necessary and reasonable expenses incurred 
for such substitute essential services 
ordinarily performed by the injured person for 
himself, his family and members of the family 
residing in the household, subject to an 
amount or limit of $12.00 per day. Such 
benefits shall be payable during the life of 
the injured person and shall be subject to an 
amount of limit of $4,380.00, on account of 
injury to any one person in any one accident. 
Defendant contends that this language limits 
the plaintiff's recovery to $12 for each day 
that actual services were performed. On this 
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theory she may recover only $12 a day for 
services which cost her $20-$25. It is 
plaintiff's position that the statute permits 
a recovery of either $12 a day for each day of 
the disability, whether or not payment for 
services was made on a daily basis, or 
$4,380.00, whichever is less. The statute is 
remedial; it is to be given a liberal 
construction. Ochs v. Federal Ins. Co., 177 
N.J. Supr. 19, 424 A.2d 849 (App.Div.1980). 
Plaintiff's interpretation satisfies that rule 
of construction. Nothing in the language of 
the law prevents that reading. It is adopted 
here for the purpose of calculating any 
recovery to which plaintiff is entitled. 
This approach is in the interest of both 
parties. Were the statute interpreted as the 
defendant suggests, a knowing claimant, who 
needed essential services of only one day a 
week, would have them performed over seven 
short days instead of one long one, recovering 
$84 (7 x $12) instead of the one day cost of 
$20-$25. Excessive recoveries will not be 
permitted under the rule here adopted: only 
"necessary and reasonable expenses" may be 
reimbursed. Gulla, 1159-60. 
Days of Disability is the 
Logical Intepretabion. 
The provisions of UCA 31A-22-307(1)(b) are directed to 
two benefits: compensation of lost wages and compensation for 
lost household services. The lost wage benefit is provided for 
"52 consecutive weeks" while the lost household services benefit 
is for "$20 per day for a maximum of 365 days." It would seem 
that both provisions are directed to the first year after injury. 
If "$20 per day of services" was intended, the benefit 
would not be limited to one year after the injury. It would 
instead continue until there had been 365 days of services. Such 
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an interpretation is inconsistent with the clear calendar year 
limit on the wage benefit and the three-day waiting period found 
in both provisions. 
The No-Fault Household Services 
Allowance is Not Concerned with the 
Source of Replacement Services* 
Even a casual reading of the three household services 
statutes indicates that they have no restrictions on the source 
of replacement services. As pointed out in Jamison vs. Utah Home 
Fire Insurance, 559 P.2d 958 (Utah 1977) and Robinson vs. 
Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 261, 409 P.2d 121 (1965), an insurance 
company cannot claim the benefit of services rendered 
gratuitously by friends and relatives. 
CONCLUSION 
The case on appeal, by itself, would be difficult to 
justify as an economic activity. The No-Fault Household Services 
Allowance presents, at most, a $7,300 issue to any given insured 
and will hopefully be for less in most cases. In the aggregate, 
however, the issue is larger because it affects so many insureds, 
most of whom are ill-equipped to pursue this matter in the 
courts. The frequency with which this statute is applied cries 
out for authoritative resolution of the fundamental question of 
how benefits are to be calculated. 
In curing this lack of authoritative interpretation, 
the Court of Appeals has an opportunity which the Third District 
-15-
Court did not. This Court's opinion can be publishec in the 
usual reporters and become a valuable reference for both 
insurance companies and insureds. 
The opinion rendered by the Court should take into 
account prior legislation on the household services allowance. 
It should interpret the statute in a manner that is logical, 
equitable, and liberal. It should determine that the allowance 
is based upon days of disability,, not days of service. 
Respectfully submitted this J ^ day of November, 1989 
TANNER, BOWEN & TANNER 
', Jr. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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1989, four true and correct copies of the foregoing instrument 
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following: 
Paul S. Felt 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
400 Deseret Building 
79 South Main Street 
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